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dispense completely with infinite totalities. This means that even ordinary logical operations such as negation are suspect when applied to formulas which contain a quantifier ranging over an infinite domain. In particular, the nesting of such quantifiers is illegal. Nevertheless, finitistic mathematics is to be adequate for elementary number-theoretic reasoning and for elementary reasoning about the manipulation of finite strings of symbols.
1.2. The second step is to reconstitute infinitistic mathematics as a big, elaborate formal system. This big system (more fully described in Hilbert [14]) contains unrestricted classical logic, infinite sets galore, and special variables ranging over natural numbers, functions from natural numbers to natural numbers, countable ordinals, etc. The formulas of the big system are strings of symbols which, according to Hilbert, are meaningless in themselves but can be manipulated finitistically.
1.3. The last step of Hilbert's program is to give a finitistically correct consistency proof for the big system. It would then follow that any H' sentence provable in the big system is finitistically true. (For an explanation of the role of H? sentences in Hilbert's program, see Kitcher [16] and Tait [25] .) Thus the big system as a whole would be finitistically justified. The infinite objects of the big system would find meaning as valid auxiliary devices used to prove theorems about physically meaningful, finitistic objects. Hilbert viewed this as a new manifestation of the method of ideal elements. That method had already served mathematics well in many other contexts.
Such was Hilbert's inspiring vision and program for the foundations of mathematics.
I have only one negative comment. With hindsight, we can see that Hilbert's proposal in step 1.2 to view infinitistic formulas as meaningless let to an unnecessary intellectual disaster. Namely, it left Hilbert wide open to Brouwer's accusation of "empty formalism". Brouwer's accusation was clearly without merit. A balanced reading shows that Hilbert's overall intention was not to divest infinitistic formulas of meaning, but rather to invest them with meaning by reference to finitistic mathematics, the meaning of which is unproblematic. Nevertheless, this part of Hilbert's formulation was confusing and made it easy for Brouwer to step in and pin Hilbert with a false label. The whole drama had the bad effect of lending undeserved respectability to empty formalism. We are still paying the price of Hilbert's rhetorical flourish. Hilbert's description of the "big system", corresponding to infinitistic mathematics, is already sufficiently precise. For my purposes here I shall identify the big system as Z2, i.e. second order arithmetic. Supplement IV of Hilbert and Bernays [15] shows that Z2 is more than adequate for the formal development of classical analysis, etc. It would not matter if we replaced Z2 by Z3, Z4, or even ZFC.
The unacceptable imprecision occurs in Hilbert's discussion of finitism. There is room for disagreement over exactly which methods Hilbert would have allowed as finitistic. This is not a defect in Hilbert's presentation. Hilbert Unfortunately, Gddel's theorem [9] shows that any such realization of step 1.3 is impossible. There are plenty of H7 sentences which are provable in Z2 but not in PRA. (An example of such a sentence is the one which asserts the consistency of the formal system Z1 of first-order arithmetic. Other examples, with a more combinatorial flavor, have been given by Friedman.) Note that Gddel's theorem does not challenge the correctness of Hilbert's formalization of infinitistic mathematics, nor does it undercut Tait's identification of finitistic mathematics with PRA. Gddel's accomplishment is merely to show that the wholesale reduction of infinitistic mathematics to finitistic mathematics, which Hilbert envisioned, cannot be pushed through.
At this point I insert a digression concerning the relationship of Hilbert's program to other reductionist programs.
In the philosophy of mathematics, a reductionist is anybody who wants to reduce all or part of mathematics to some restricted set of "acceptable" principles. Hilbert These examples show that WKLo is strong enough to prove a great many theorems of classical infinitistic mathematics, including some of the best-known nonconstructive theorems. Combining this with the results of Friedman and Sieg, we see that a large and significant part of mathematical practice is finitistically reducible. Thus we have in hand a rather far-reaching partial realization of Hilbert's program.
This partial realization of Hilbert's program has an interesting application to the problem of "elementary" proofs of theorems from analytic number theory. Using 3.2 we can formalize the technique of contour integration within WKLo. Using conservativity of WKLo over PRA, we can then "eliminate" this technique. Our conclusion is that any H' number-theoretic theorem which is provable using contour integration can also be proved "elementarily", i.e. within PRA. ?4. The role of reverse mathematics. The purpose of this section is to discuss reverse mathematics and its relationship to our previously described partial realization of Hilbert's program.
Reverse mathematics is a highly developed research program whose purpose is to investigate the role of strong set existence axioms in ordinary mathematics. The main question is as follows. Given a specific theorem -of ordinary mathematics, which set existence axioms are needed in order to prove T? Reverse mathematics is a technique which frequently yields precise answers to special cases of this question.
A fairly detailed survey of reverse mathematics will be found in my appendix to the forthcoming second edition of Takeuti Given a mathematical theorem -r, the general procedure for identifying S(-r) is to show that the principal set existence axiom of S(-r) is equivalent to -r, the equivalence being provable in some weaker system in which -r itself is not provable. For instance, the way to show that S(-c) = WKLo is to show that -r is equivalent to weak Kdnig's lemma, the equivalence being provable in the weaker system RCAo. Our slogan "reverse mathematics" arises in the following way. The usual pattern of mathematical reasoning is to deduce a theorem from some axioms. This might be called "forward mathematics". But in order to establish that the axioms are needed for a proof of the theorem, one must reverse the process and deduce the axioms from the theorem. Hence "reverse mathematics".
As What chiefly concerns us here is not utility but scientific truth. Of course the two issues are related. Pragmatists might argue that mathematics is useful and therefore valid. But such an inference can cover only applied mathematics and is anyhow a non sequitur. It makes much more sense to argue that mathematics is true and therefore useful. In the last analysis, the only way to demonstrate that mathematics is valid is to show that it refers to reality.
And make no mistake about it-the validity of mathematics is under siege. In a widely cited article [ In the face of the attack on mathematics, what defense is offered by the existing schools of the philosophy of mathematics? Consider first the logicists. They say that mathematics is logic, logic consists of analytic truths, and analytic truths are those which are independent of subject matter. In short, mathematics is a science with no subject matter. What about the formalists? According to them, mathematics is a process of manipulating symbols which need not symbolize anything. Then there are the intuitionists, who say that mathematics consists of mental constructions which have no necessary relation to external reality, if indeed there is any such thing as external reality. Finally we come to the Platonists. They are better than the others because at least they allow mathematics to have some subject matter. But the subject matter which they postulate is a separate universe of objects and structures which bear no necessary relation to the real world of entities and processes. (They use the term "real world" referring not to the real real world but to their ideal universe of mathematical objects. The real real world is absent from their theory.) I submit that none of these schools is in a position to defend mathematics against the Russells and the Klines. There is a long history of doubts about the role of the infinite in mathematics. Aristotle's discussion of the infinite is more acute than modern ones but still inconclusive. Euclid achieved rigor in part by avoiding all reference to the infinite. Archimedes used infinite limit processes but never rigorously justified them. Later, infinitesimals in calculus were the occasion of intense philosophic controversy. Doubts about infinitesimals were exploited by Bishop Berkeley in his mystical assault on science and Enlightenment values. Weierstrass' arithmetization of calculus restored clarity and rigor, but the respite was only temporary. Controversy about the infinite was never more intense than in our own century.
The problem is that the infinite does not obviously correspond to anything in reality. The real world is made up of finite entities and processes. Everything that exists has a definite nature and is therefore in some sense limited. Aristotle argues for the real-world existence of the infinite, but only by recourse to a distinction between potential and actual infinity. Hilbert uses physical arguments to deny the existence of the infinite anywhere except in thought. Certainly any convincing account of the relationship between the infinite and the real world would have to be fairly subtle.
By contrast, the formulas of finitistic mathematics refer in a relatively unproblematic, common-sense way to various discrete or cyclical real-world processes. Having said this, I must admit that my plodding procedure lacks the grand sweep of Hilbert's plan. But to some extent this is inevitable in view of Gddel's theorem. In any case, if there is a better procedure, I challenge the questioner to find it. Granted, it would be desirable to have a wholesale finitistic reduction of a large and easily identifiable part of infinitistic mathematics. But we do not know whether this is possible. In the meantime it seems desirable to establish finitistic reducibility for as much of infinitistic mathematics as we can. Moreover, the experience so gained may turn out to be useful in the larger task of validating infinitistic mathematics by methods not restricted to finitistic reductionism. It seems reasonable to hope that patience will pay off here.
5.10. The deduction of axioms from theorems seems like a very strange activity. Certainly such a wrong-headed enterprise would never have been tolerated by Hilbert. Can't we dismiss as mere propaganda the attempt to associate reverse mathematics with Hilbert's program?
No, we cannot. It is true that the deduction of axioms from theorems is absent from Hilbert's formulation of his program. It is likewise absent from the final form of our results, discussed in ?3 above, which constitute partial realizations of Hilbert's program. However, reverse mathematics has played and will continue to play an important behind-the-scenes heuristic role in the discovery of such results. As explained and illustrated in ?4, the interplay between "forward mathematics" and reverse mathematics leads to the discovery of formal systems such as WKLo and WKL+. That same interplay is essential to the ongoing process whereby we delimit the parts of mathematics that can be developed in such systems. Finitistic reductionism is not the only plausible method by which to validate infinitistic mathematics. One might try to show that a substantial part of infinitistic mathematics is directly interpretable in the real world. Continuous real-world processes have not been sufficiently exploited. Aristotle's notion of potential infinity could be of value. Nevertheless, of all the possible approaches, the indirect one via finitism seems to be the most convincing.
